Against the Grain
Manuscript 8180

Straight Talk — Springer Nature Cancels €3.2 Billion IPO at the
Last Minute
Dan Tonkery

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/atg
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries.
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

Straight Talk — Springer Nature Cancels €3.2 Billion
IPO at the Last Minute
Column Editor: Dan Tonkery (President and CEO, Content Strategies, Inc., 17 W. 17th Street, 7th Floor, New York,
NY 10011; Phone: 973-206-8211) <tonkery@gmail.com> www.contentstrategies.com

T

he library, publishing and investment
community news sources have been
filled with articles and notices announcing Springer Nature’s failed IPO. What’s
the story here? Does this mean that Springer
Nature is in financial trouble? What does this
failed IPO mean for the library community?
Has the Open Access movement put a stake in
the financial plans of our second largest STM
publisher? I am not sure that the answer is all
that complex. Before I tackle that issue perhaps
a little background is necessary as this is not the
first time an IPO has been on the table.
In 2015, Springer Nature was formed
by the merger of publishing units from the
Holtzbrinck Publishing Group and Springer
Science+Business Media held by the large
venture firm BC Partners.
Springer is not a new company but has a
long history of scientific publishing founded
in 1842. My first exposure to Springer was
in 1973. As a new librarian working at the
National Library of Medicine I was given the
task of working with the top 50 STM publishers
and selling them on the concept of Cataloging
in Publication. I visited all 50 publishers and
worked with their editorial staff to implement
the CIP program. One of my favorite publishers was Springer. They were an old world
classic German publisher and I visited them
every time I was in New York City. The friends
that I made there lasted for more than 25 years
and I was fortunate enough to continue working
with various family members during my tenure
as President and CEO of Readmore, a library
subscription agent based in NYC. Every year
for ten years that I attended the Frankfurt
BookFair for Readmore, I was invited to the
private dinner that Springer held for the major
subscription agents. Springer was a family
run company with a great corporate culture.
As the Springer family aged and lacked
new leadership, the company was sold and
fell into the hands of Bertelsmann. Bertelsmann owned Springer from 1998-2003 and
basically left them alone. They were more like
caretakers than new owners. With some chaotic changes in Bertelsmann’s management,
the company began selling off several of its
newer acquisitions including Springer. In
the spring of 2003, Springer was sold to two
British private-equity firms Cinven and Candover. Cinven and Candover also acquired
Kluwer Academic Publishers and merged
the two companies. In 2004, Derk Haank,
the chairman of Elsevier was poached to lead
Springer. Cinven and Candover had a plan
to take Springer public and with the addition
of Kluwer Academic plus the leadership of
Haank, the stage was set for a public offering.
In fact, Haank was promised a huge payday
as a condition to leave Elsevier and lead the
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new Springer. The combined Springer and
Kluwer revenues were sufficient to support the
market expectation and an IPO was considered
nearly certain.
In the end the global financial
meltdown in 2006-7 ruined the
Springer IPO opportunity and
Cinven and Candover did
the next best thing. They
raided Springer’s assets, stripped out as
much cash as possible,
and borrowed heavily
leaving Springer in
near financial ruins and then sold
Springer with its new debt to EQT and GIC
in 2009. After a short time, the next venture
group sold Springer to BC Partners in 2013
for €3 billion.
Since 2004, Springer has been under the
same leadership. Derk Haank has had to face
different owners, changes in market conditions
and expectations, navigate the Open Access
movement, continue to grow the business even
with the library attacks on the Big Deals. He
continued to grow the company and prosper
independent of market conditions. His 13
years at the helm of Springer showed his high
level of competence and stomach for managing
through chaos.
The new owners BC Capital Partners soon
decided that Springer by themselves would
not make a strong IPO candidate primarily
due to the heavy debt load that was still on
Springer’s books. They went looking for a
partner that would greatly improve the story
to investors, someone with blue ribbon credentials and a merger partner that would improve
the financial conditions that the market seeks
for a successful IPO.
Within a short time, BC Partners found
a very successful potential IPO partner and
they convinced Stefan von Holtzbrinck of
the benefits and serious financial rewards that
would come from a merger of the privately
held Holtzbrinck Publishing Group’s Nature
Publishing Group, Palgrave Macmillan, and
Macmillan Education. Stefan was sold on an
opportunity to significantly increase the value
of his publishing units and to enjoy a very
handsome payday. A merger was completed
with Holtzbrinck owning 53% of the new
company and plans for a public offering were
developed. Derk Haank had been planning for
this IPO since 2004. His goal to run an IPO was
finally in range. In the end Derk did not see
his dream fulfilled at least under his leadership.
Working for a venture firm is always difficult as the venture organization often lacks a
real understanding of the market but does give
CEO’s an opportunity to achieve certain goals.

The downside is that if you don’t achieve those
goals, then a change of management occurs. In
the Springer Nature case certain targets were
established, and Springer did not achieve
those goals partly due to a change in
market conditions. Derk could no
longer keep the wolf from his door.
Springer Nature was left to announce Derk’s retirement. A sad
farewell to the one executive
that had worked tirelessly
to keep Springer alive and
thriving. But business is
business and the owners
wanted an IPO. A new CEO
from the business world was hired to deliver
on the IPO promise. Daniel Ropers the very
successful founder and CEO of bol.com who
has a sterling reputation in the investment community was brought in to orchestrate the IPO.
Now with the IPO planning back on track,
JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley were hired
as the global coordinators. Bank of America,
Merrill Lynch, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse,
Goldman Sachs and Societe Generale are the
book runners. Everything was planned for July
2018, but then suddenly the IPO was moved
up to the end of April. The IPO had the best
banks lined up to sell the offering to potential
investors. Normally an offering with this type
of backing would be a slam dunk, the story
was solid, the companies are highly profitable.
Springer Nature posted €1.62 billion euros
in sales last year and employs 13,000 staff. It
publishes 3,000 scientific journals and about
12,000 new books a year. Its 2017 EBITDA
of just below €600 million euros after €564
million in 2016 is still a solid profit return.
And yet with all that revenue and profit, the
IPO was killed! Why? How could this happen?
Is Springer Nature in trouble? What does this
mean to my library, my big deal, or access to
my e-subscriptions?
First and foremost, I believe that Springer
Nature is a solid well-run company and your
library subscriptions are secure. Your ebooks
and big deal will continue. Springer is also
one of the largest open access publisher’s
publishing over 550 OA titles each year and
this is a growing area. Unfortunately, most OA
titles do not deliver the same level of revenue
as a traditional subscription title. STM titles
published even with the Gold OA model do not
yield the same revenue and that is not likely
to improve soon. Springer still obtains 95%
of their profitability from traditional scholarly
publishing.
There are some individuals in the library
community that would like to think that the
OA access movement was largely responsible
for Springer Nature’s failed IPO. That the
continued on page 71
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uncertainly of the market has cast a shadow on
Springer Nature. Certainly, the investment
community is aware of the OA movement but
when you review Springer’s renewal rates for
their Big Deals or consider any other financial
factor, other than a large amount of OA chatter,
the OA access movement has done very little
damage to Springer Nature, nor has the OA
movement hurt the financial returns of Elsevier’s RELX, Kluwer or Informa the owner
of Taylor & Francis. I would have to say
while the OA movement is alive and well, it
has not impacted the financial performance of
any publicly held STM company and I don’t
believe that the investment community was in
any way influenced or bothered by this factor
when considering the investment in the IPO.
What then explains the failed IPO?
I believe that there are three primary reasons that the Springer Nature IPO failed.
I believe the primary issue is the debt level.
The IPO proceeds would have been used to
reduce Springer Nature’s debt level down
to 3.75 times earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation, and amortization. Springer’s
debt currently stands at €3 billion euros and
too much of the IPO funds raised were going
to be used to pay down the debt. Why would
an investor that is already carrying Springer

Against the Grain / November 2018

bonds want to buy more debt or just replace one
form of investment for another? Springer has
too much debt and I believe that the company
should have renegotiated their debt with their
banks and reduced the level down to a more
manageable level. Investors did not like buying debt. Shareholders don’t like to use their
funds to cover housekeeping items. They often
want their money used to expand products and
services, for acquisitions, or to fund growth.
The second reason for the IPO failure is the
lack of growth opportunity. Investors while
happy to see a well-run company that is profitable, always demand to see substantial growth
potential. A 3% growth forecast is almost
surely a kiss of death for a deal. It certainly
takes any excitement out of an investment
opportunity. Given so much of the investment
money chasing IPO’s these days is being used
to invest in some form of internet idea, along
comes Spring Nature and offers a story of 3%
growth with a promise that it could get worse if
the OA access movement gets out of hand. So
really the best growth rate an investor will ever
see out of Springer is a disappointing 3% and
investors must be prepared for the possibility
that growth rate get even worse. Not a very
exciting story to sell investors.
Perhaps the last reason that the Springer
Nature IPO failed is that investors were pricing
the IPO at the bottom range of the offering.
The bookrunners selling the IPO had to offer
the shares at a considerable discount, below

the price that the owners had expected. The
investment banks had priced the offering at
€10.50-€14.50 range per share. Most of the
contracts for shares came in at the low end
of the offering price. The target price was
so low that BC Partners decided not to sell
any of their holdings and to keep their current
investment. This is significant because the IPO
was going to be a big payday for BC Partners.
A weak market demand for Springer Nature shares, the low IPO price per share, the
lack of growth and high debt level all created
the perfect storm. The owners decided to cancel the IPO. Wise decision? Perhaps but my
personal feeling is that the market conditions
may continue to deteriorate, as the growth rate
is not going to improve, and OA investment
will not yield the same financial rate as a
traditional journal. I think I would have gone
for the IPO now. At least the debt level could
have been addressed.
The library community can expect business
as usual. The IPO makes little difference to
the everyday workings of our second largest
publisher. What Springer needs is a merger
with another group that is growing rapidly and
is profitable. Stay tuned to see if Springer
Nature decides to try another IPO.
Publicly owned or private publisher,
Springer Nature still has a significant impact
on academic libraries and that role should
continue for years to come.
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